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Introduction
While, as the European Commission acknowledges, Member States
retain sovereignty over natural resources such as hydrocarbons, they must
still respect the fundamental rules of the EEC Treaty.' Indeed, the com-
mon oil policy advocated by the Community institutions assumes that a
solution to the Community's oil problems should be sought within the
framework of these rules.2 However, application of these rules raises sev-
eral complex issues for the United Kingdom.
Licensing
The Treaty of Accession tackled only one such issue. At that time Regu-
lation 4 of the Petroleum (Production) Regulations 19643 required that
applicants for a North Sea exploration or production license be United
Kingdom citizens or companies incorporated in the United Kingdom. This
requirement was incompatible with Articles 52-63 of the EEC Treaty,
which deal with freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services,
and, more particularly, with Directives 64/4284 and 69/82, 5 which require
equality of treatment for companies wishing to explore for or extract oil as
licence-holders in a Member State other than their own or to carry on such
activity on behalf of licence-holders. Accordingly, the Treaty of Accession 6
stipulated that the discriminatory clause in the Petroleum (Production)
Regulations be abolished. This was eventually effected by Regulation 4 of
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the Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976,7 which states that any person
may apply for a licence.
On the other hand, the right of the Secretary of State to revoke a licence
where the company concerned ceases to have its central management and
control in the United Kingdom has been retained in the new Regulations. 8
The European Commission did contact the government about this provi-
sion for revocation, but the latter replied that no discrimination on grounds
of nationality was involved and that the provision was necessary for taxa-
tion purposes and to ensure that staff in the company's United Kingdom
office would be able to take authoritative decisions, especially in emergen-
cies. 9 Since then, the Commission has apparently not pressed the matter.
Moreover, the discretion enjoyed by the government as regards the grant
of licences provides opportunities for discrimination. For example, one of
the factors taken into account by the government in the exercise of its dis-
cretion is the extent of the contribution which the applicant has made or is
planning to make to the economy of the United Kingdom.' 0 Presumably, a
British company would be able to satisfy this test more easily than a com-
pany from another Member State. As early as 1968, the Commission
recognised the existence of such problems in connexion with licences
granted in the Six and advocated the introduction of objective criteria for
the grant of such licences.'I However, no concrete proposal for an appro-
priate Community enactment has been presented to the Council of
Ministers.
Nevertheless, the case law of the European Court may have important
implications in this area. In Van Haaster12 in 1974 the Court was con-
cerned with the legality of a requirement in Dutch legislation that hyacinth
growers must possess a licence. In the view of the Court, while this legisla-
tion was directed towards the production of hyacinths, it might still have
effects on their marketing and thus be incompatible with the principle of the
free movement of goods. However, assessment of the legality of these
effects depended on the common organisation in hyacinths established by
Regulation 234/68.13 Since the production licensing system was incompati-
ble with this organisation, it was prohibited. 14 It appeared, then, that it was
only because of this Regulation and thus the existence of a common organi-
sation in the sector concerned that the system was prohibited.
However, the decisive significance of a common organisation was less
clear in Kramer 15 two years later. This ruling was concerned with national
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quotas on fish catches. According to the Court, the question whether a
measure limiting agricultural production was prohibited or not depended
on the global system established by the basic community rules in the partic-
ular sector and on the objectives of these rules. Since the quotas were
found to be compatible with the objectives of the Community fishery pol-
icy, they were not prohibited.' 6 This ruling did not explain what signifi-
cance was attached to the existence of a common organisation. However,
the remarks of Advocate-General Trabucchi are notable. He maintained
that the national measures concerned would be permissible if they were
taken with a view to attainment of an objective of the Community policy.
Apparently, then, the existence of these objectives was, in his view, decisive
as the ground for the measures in question being found permissible.17 His
reasoning, therefore, suggests that, in the absence of a common organisa-
tion, the production quotas might have been prohibited by Article 34 of the
Treaty, which covers measures having equivalent effect to quantitative
restrictions on exports to other Member States.
Partial confirmation of this view was supplied in Sergius Oebe1 8 in July,
1981. In this case the Court was concerned with Germany which prohib-
ited work being carried out in bakeries between 10:00 P.M. and 5:45 A.M.
and thus might restrict production. The Court ruled that national measures
which have as their specific object or effect the restriction of patterns of
exports and thereby the establishment of a difference in treatment between
the domestic trade of a Member State and its export trade in such a way as
to provide a particular advantage for national production were prohibited
by Article 34. Therefore, insofar as the United Kingdom licensing system is
employed to favour companies which will refine their North Sea production
in the United Kingdom or at least market their crude oil in this country,
there will be an infringement of Article 34. However, it does not appear
that the Commission has yet raised this question with the government.
On the other hand, the Commission has apparently made representations
regarding the compatibility of another aspect of the licensing system with
Article 34. Clause 28 (1) of the Model Clauses for North Sea licences
annexed to the Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976 requires that all
oil extracted from the United Kingdom Continental Shelf be landed in the
United Kingdom. This requirement is said to be designed to ensure that
domestic oil needs are as far as possible met from North Sea reserves and
that the United Kingdom gains the greatest possible balance of payments
benefit from the exploitation of these reserves. Most commentators feel
that, inasmuch as this requirement makes the export of North Sea oil to
another Member State less practicable and more expensive, it does consti-
tute an infringement of Article 34.19 Accordingly, the Commission has con-
'"Id. 1313.
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tacted the government on this issue.20 It is possible that as a result of such
informal representations from the Commission, the government has
become more willing to grant a waiver from this requirement as permitted
by Clause 28 (2). Certainly, in April, 1978 such a waiver was granted to the
West German company, Deminex, so that it could export half of its share of
crude oil extracted from the Thistle Field directly to the Federal Republic.
Nevertheless, oil companies, aware of the government's preference for
North Sea oil to be landed in the United Kingdom, may be reluctant to seek
many such favours for fear of prejudicing any future licence applications
they may make, given that licences are only granted at the discretion of the
government.
In fact, however, even if the government were to grant waivers automati-
cally, this would not necessarily save the landing requirement from the
Article 34 prohibition. In the International Fruit Company2' case in 1971
the European Court ruled that a national provision which required, even
purely as a formality, an import or export licence or any similar procedure
was prohibited. 22 As the Court insisted in Dassonville,23 the prohibition
covers all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable,
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, of hindering intra-Community
trade.24 The requirement that North Sea production may only be exported
directly where a waiver is granted would seem to fall with the Article 34
prohibition as interpreted by the Court. Therefore, the Commission could,
it seems, institute proceedings against the United Kingdom under Article
169 of the Treaty. Provided specified procedural conditions are met, this
provision empowers the Commission to bring a Member State in breach of
Community law before the Court.
The fact that the Commission has not yet taken such action may perhaps
be attributable to its satisfaction that, in practice, waivers are granted with
sufficient readiness to avoid any actual restriction of exports to other Mem-
ber States. Alternatively, the Commission may have been influenced by
certain legal difficulties. In particular, it should be noted that the landing
requirement is not contained in the Regulations themselves but in the
model clauses for licences. Thus the legal effect of this requirement derives
from contract rather than legislation. In these circumstances, it is not clear
that the requirement constitutes a measure having equivalent to a quantita-
tive restriction for the purposes of Article 34. It is true that in a line of cases
following Deutsche Grammaphon the Court recognised that companies
seeking to enforce contractual rights to industrial property might infringe
Articles 30-34.25 However, the ultimate basis of these rights was legislative,
2 See the Reply of Commissioner Davignon to an Oral Question (E.P. Debs No. 214, 77, 10
March 1977).
2 Cases 51-54/71 (1971) E.C.R. 1107.
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and the action of the companies concerned in reality constituted an attempt
to secure enforcement of a legislative prohibition on infringement of indus-
trial property rights.26 The same could not be said of the landing require-
ment. Moreover, since the licences may be treated as setting out
proprietary rights over oil extracted from the North Sea, the government
may argue that their terms are protected by Article 222, according to which
none of the provisions of the Treaty are to prejudice national law governing
property ownership. Nevertheless, the Court has always insisted that while
this provision may safeguard the existence or "specific subject matter" of
property rights, it does not permit them to be exercised in disregard of the
rules of the common market. 27 A final source of uncertainty arises from
doubts as to the applicability of the Treaty to the continental shelf 28-a
matter which has not yet been squarely faced by the Court. In view of these
three questions, the Commission may feel that the legal situation is insuffi-
ciently clear to justify institution of formal proceedings in such a politically
controversial area. 29 Indeed, Article 169 requires that the Commission
"consider" a Member State to be in breach of Community law before the
procedure contained in this provision is initiated. It is possible that the
Commission does not believe this requirement to be met.
Interest Relief Grant Scheme
In fact, the only element of the United Kingdom's North Sea oil policy in
respect of which the Commission has taken formal action was the interest
relief grant scheme. This scheme, operated under section 8 of the Industry
Act 1972, allowed for the government to pay 3 percent for up to eight years
of the interest on loans needed by North Sea operators for the purchase of
equipment or services from companies in the United Kingdom. The Com-
mission felt that, as it stood, this scheme was incompatible with the com-
mon market under Article 92(1) of the Treaty, which deals with state aids.
However, if the aid were made available in the case of purchases from any
company in the Community, it would assist in the development of the oil
industry in the Community-a principal objective of the common oil policy
advocated by the Community institutions 3 0 -and could, therefore, be per-
mitted. Since the government proved unwilling to extend the scope of the
scheme in this way, the Commission issued a Decision on May 1, 1979
requiring the government to cease offering grants for contracts two months
2 Cf. F.G. Jacobs, Industrial Property and the EEC Treatyf-A Reply, 24 I.C.L.Q. (1975)
643-58, 646.
27See, e.g., Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig (1966) E.C.R. 299, 345'
2
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of the E.E.C. Treaty to the Continental Shelf, SEC (70) 3095 final. See also Woodliffe, North
Sea Oil and Gas-The European Community Connection, 12 C.M.L.R. (1975) 7-26.2 The Commission has generally proved reluctant to employ the Article 169 procedure in
such areas. See Evans, The Enforcement Procedure ofArticle 169 EEC- Commission Discre-
tion, 4 E.L. REV. (1979) 442-56.
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after that date.3 1 The scheme was duly terminated.32 However, it may be
doubted whether the government would have been willing to put an end to
the scheme, had it not been committed generally to reduction of public
expenditure. Besides, the government apparently takes advantage of the
discretionary nature of the system whereby licences are granted so as to put
pressure on applicants to favour the purchase of British goods and serv-
ices. 33 Moreover, the Offshore Supplies Office is in a position to operate as
an instrument for ensuring that such purchases are favoured.34 Therefore,
the government may have been satisfied that the interests of British suppli-
ers could be safeguarded without the expenditure entailed by the interest
relief grant scheme. Accordingly, the Commission has apparently taken up
these possible infringements of the freedom to provide services and the free
movement of goods with the government 35 but has not yet pressed the
matter.
British National Oil Corporation
The most serious problems, however, arise in relation to the British
National Oil Corporation, which was established under the Petroleum and
Submarine Pipelines Act 1975 to ensure state participation in the exploita-
tion of the North Sea reserves. 36 The tasks of the Corporation are set out in
section 2(1) of this Act. Under section 2(1)(e) the Corporation is to do any-
thing required of it to give effect to participation agreements entered into by
the Secretary of State with companies operating in the North Sea. As far as
the first four licensing rounds were concerned, such agreements resulted
from the renegotiation of existing licences. The new terms granted BNOC
an option to purchase 51 percent of the oil produced under each licence. In
the case of companies with United Kingdom refineries, sale back arrange-
ments were included on condition that the company concerned refined the
oil in question in the United Kingdom.37 In some cases, however, oil sold
back in this way could be exported, provided that it was substituted with an
equivalent quantity of imported oil. 38 In the fifth and sixth licensing
rounds the participation agreements entailed BNOC becoming a full co-
3 See Commission Reply to Written Question 723/78 by Mrs. Ewing (O.J. 1979, C185/1).
32See the Reply of Mr. Gray to a Written Question by Mr. Wilson (974 H.C. Deb. 5s.c. 207,
November 21, 1979).
33See FIRST REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, NORTH SEA OIL AND
GAS, 1972-73, HC 122, 53.3
1See the Memorandum of Understanding of the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Asso-
ciation, annexed to an Offshore Supplies Office Press Notice, November 6, 1975.
"Commission Reply to Written Question 280/77 (O.J. 1978, 277/1).
3United Kingdom Oil and Gas Policy, Cmnd. 5696. On BNOC see generaly Woodliffe, State
Participation in the Development of United Kingdom Petroleum Reserves, (1977) Public Law
249-71.
"See, e.g., the agreement concluded with Mobil (Dep't of Energy Press Notice, April 6,
1978).
"See, e.g., the agreement concluded with Chevron (Dep't of Energy Press Notice, February
16, 1978).
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licensee and enjoying proprietary rights over 51 percent of the oil pro-
duced, 39 though in the seventh round the present government decided that
the Corporation should merely have an option to purchase 51 percent of the
oil.40 Secondly, under Section 2(l)(d) of the Act the Corporation is to per-
form services required of it by any Minister of the Crown. In particular, the
Corporation is required to dispose of the 12 percent of a licencee's pro-
duction which the government may take as royalty.4 1 Thirdly, the Corpo-
ration was empowered under Section 2(l)(a) to explore for and produce oil
on its own account and has, accordingly, become sole licensee in certain
fields such as Clyde and Caber. Finally, under section 2(1)(c) the Corpora-
tion is empowered to trade in oil with commercial companies and may thus
sell oil not covered by sale back arrangements and purchase oil additional
to that obtained through arrangements for participation or the payment of
royalty in kind. As a result, the Corporation handles between a half and
two-thirds of total production from the United Kingdom continental shelf.
In carrying out the relevant operations the Corporation works closely
with the government. In particular, it is apparently the government which
decides whether the conditions for sale back are met, and where the Corpo-
ration handles royalty oil it will do so on behalf of the government and in
accordance with its instructions. More generally, Section 3(1) of the 1975
Act requires that in formulating plans for its general conduct the Corpora-
tion must act upon lines settled from time to time with the government, and
Section 4 empowers the latter to issue any general or specific directions to
the Corporation thought fit. Finally, Sections 40 et seq. of the Act provided
for the Corporation to be financed from the National Oil Account, which
was under government control, and under Section 1(3)(c) there are to be
two serving civil servants on the board of the Corporation.42 The Commis-
sion was apparently concerned that this manner of financing for the Corpo-
ration may have constituted state aid of the kind prohibited by Article 92 of
the Treaty, and the present government's commitment to reducing the size
of the public sector in the British economy lead to the Petroleum and Conti-
nental Shelf Bill,43 which makes provision for the abolition of the National
Oil Account. Nevertheless, the other features of the Act mentioned above
remain, and these mean that the Corporation may be tightly controlled by
the government. In effect, the Corporation provides an instrument through
which the government may determine the destination of up to two-thirds of
3 Dept. of Energy Press Notice, January 5, 1977.
'Dept. of Energy Press Notice, July 2, 1980.
"The power of the government to take royalty in kind was incorporated into the licenses in
accordance with Model Clause II in Part II of Schedule 2 to the 1975 Act. The government
began to require the payment of some royalty in this way in the second half of 1979. See Dept.
of Energy Press Notice, August 25, 1978.
S42T.C. DAINTITH AND G.D.M. WILLOUGHBY, A MANUAL OF UNITED KINGDOM OIL AND
GAS LAW (London, 1977), 18 describes this latter arrangement as unprecedented in the history
of British public enterprise.
43House of Commons Bill 62, Sess. 1980-81.
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North Sea production. Thus in 1976 the government announced that its
policy was that this proportion was expected to be refined in the United
Kingdom.44
However, several problems arise in relation to Community law. In the
first place, Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty are applicable to BNOC. The
wording of both provisions covers "any undertaking." In the absence of
any restrictive definition of the term, its applicability to both public and
private undertakings may be assumed. Indeed, this is confirmed by Article
90 (2), which states that the rules of the Treaty, including those contained in
Articles 85-94, apply to public undertakings.
As for Article 85, paragraph one of this provision prohibits agreements
between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the common market. Clauses in participation agree-
ments concluded in respect of the first four licensing rounds which required
domestic refining or at least substitution by an equivalent quantity of
imported oil as a condition for sale back of the oil purchased by the Corpo-
ration would seem to be caught by Article 85. Moreover, there is evidence
that similar clauses are included in BNOC contracts for the sale of oil other
than that covered by sale back arrangements. 45 These too would seem to
offend against Article 85.
As for Article 86, this provision prohibits an undertaking from abusing a
dominant position in a substantial part of the common market insofar as it
may affect trade between Member States. The inclusion of the above-men-
tioned clauses in BNOC contracts for the sale of oil might amount to the
imposition of unfair trading conditions as prohibited by Article 86(b).
Moreover, the Commercial Solvenis4 6 and A.B. . 4 7 rulings demonstrate
that a refusal to sell may constitute an abuse for the purposes of Article 86.
Certainly, if BNOC were to refuse to sell to a company unable to satisfy the
sale back conditions, such an abuse would appear to be present. As for the
position of BNOC, the Corporation's involvement in the disposal of over
half of North Sea oil production means that it is held in a substantial part
of the common market. However, it is less clear whether the Corporation's
position can be described as one of dominance. Dominance has been
defined by the European Court as the ability to act independently without
taking into account to any substantial extent competitors or purchasers or
suppliers.4 8 In normal circumstances, the international oil market is such
that purchasers refused oil by the Corporation would be able to obtain sat-
.Sunday Times, April 4, 1976.
4 Thus in July 1979 the government called upon the Corporation to renegotiate certain of its
contracts to prevent North Sea production being "diverted" from the United Kingdom (969
H.C. Deb. 5s.c. 910, 2 July 1979).
"Cases 6 and 7/73 (1974) 1 E.C.R. 223.
17Case 77/77 B.P. v. Commission (1978) E.C.R. 1513.
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isfactory supplies elsewhere, and the Corporation's competitors could thus
take advantage of its refusal to supply. It does not seem possible, then, to
say that the Corporation normally enjoys a dominant position. However, in
the A.B. G. case the Commission argued that an undertaking might find
itself in a dominant position as a result of structural changes in the market
itself, such as those resulting from an international oil shortage.49 This
argument was rejected by Advocate-General Warner,50 but the Court itself
did not expressly consider this argument and was able to decide the case on
a different point. Therefore, the possibility remains that BNOC might
abuse a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86, if it imposed
conditions requiring domestic refining or at least substitution by imported
oil in contracts for the sale of North Sea production or refused to sell to a
company unable to satisfy these conditions.
It is true that under Article 90(2) undertakings, such as BNOC, entrusted
with the operation of services of general economic interest benefit from a
certain relaxation of the rules of the common market. However, this provi-
sion goes on to stipulate that the development of trade must not be affected
to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the common mar-
ket. The restriction of trade in oil which may result from BNOC operations
is incompatible with the interests of the Community as expressed in the
common oil policy and, more particularly, is likely to exacerbate the effects
of an international oil shortage within the Community as a whole. There-
fore, insofar as the Corporation does infringe Article 85 or 86, the infringe-
ments will not be saved by Article 90(2).5
However, it is established that a public undertaking itself cannot infringe
these provisions when, like the BNOC, it is not acting independently but
merely carrying out government instructions.5 2 Thus in March, 1977 the
European Commission announced that there was no reason to believe that
BNOC was not respecting the Treaty.53 Nevertheless, the related action of
the United Kingdom government may be incompatible with the Treaty,
and it is this question which the Commission is currently examining.54
In particular, Article 37(1) requires the Member States to adjust their
commercial monopolies so as to ensure that no discrimination exists
between nationals of Member States regarding the conditions under which
goods are procured or marketed. The conditions for sale back and similar
clauses in other BNOC contracts for the sale of oil would seem to involve
such discrimination, since they discriminate against companies from other
"(1978) E.C.R. 1513, 1520.
11Id. 1537.
"See also D. Vaughan, U.K and E.E. C. Anti-Trust Implications, PLET SEMINAR, Cam-
bridge, 1978 (Paper 24(a)).
"Pappalardo, Regime de L'Article 90. Aspects Juridiques, SEMAINE DE BRUGES 1968
(Bruges, 1969), 75-103, 86.
"See Commission Reply to an Oral Question by Lord Bessborough (E.P. Debs No. 214, 77,
10 March 1977).
'See Commission Reply to Written Question 723/78 by Mrs. Ewing (O.J. 1979, C185/1).
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Member States wishing to refine the oil concerned outside the United King-
dom. However, a commercial monopoly is defined in Article 37(1) as a body
through which a Member State, in law or in fact, directly or indirectly,
supervises, determines or appreciably influences imports or exports between
Member States. As the European Court stated in Costa v. EN.E.L. ,5 this
means that an undertaking must play an effective role in the import or
export of a particular product.5 6 In other words, the pattern of North Sea
oil trade must be shown to be different from what it would have been in the
absence of BNOC operations. However, in April, 1978, either because of
informal representations from the Commission or oil company pressure
based on the fact that a suitable refinery input mix requires the export of
some North Sea production and the import of heavier crudes from else-
where, the government announced that its policy of requiring up to two-
thirds of North Sea production to be refined in the United Kingdom had
been relaxed.57 This announcement may have been associated with
increased use of the substitution option in BNOC contracts. If so, the effect
of BNOC operations may merely be to ensure that maximum possible use is
made of North Sea production for meeting domestic refinery needs. This
would presumably have occurred even in the absence of BNOC. Therefore,
in normal circumstances it will not be easy to prove that the Corporation
constitutes a body of the kind envisaged by Article 37(1). However, in the
context of an international oil shortage the Corporation might be instructed
to include no substitution option in its contracts, and the oil companies
might have insufficient oil from elsewhere to take advantage of existing
options. In these circumstances, the Corporation would constitute a body
of the kind envisaged by Article 37(1), and the United Kingdom would be
in breach of this provision. Certainly, there is evidence that the government
intends to employ the Corporation to restrict North Sea oil exports in the
face of such a shortage.5 8 Indeed, this intention may have been one of the
factors which prevented United Kingdom representatives in the Council of
Ministers from approving59 a Commission proposal of December 197760
which would have required that in an international oil shortage the Mem-
ber States ensure that their supplies of indigenous crude oil (or petroleum
products derived from it) be maintained at the average quarterly level of
the previous year.
Moreover, even though Article 37(1) may be regarded as lex special/s in
relation to "commercial monopolies," the European Court has accepted
that other provisions of the Treaty may still be applicable in the case of
"Case 6/64 (1964) E.C.R. 585.561d. 598.
57See the Reply of Dr. Mabon to a Written Question by Mr. Skeet (948 H.C. Deb. 5s.c.161-
62, 19 April 1978).480.J. 1978, C15/3.
59TWENTY-FIFTH REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN LEGISLATION,
1977-78, HC 69 iv and v, 6.
"
0See, e.g., Standing Committee D, 13th Sitting, June 24, 1975, col. 760.
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such bodies. First, Article 34 may be infringed where the government
enforces sale back conditions to prevent the sale of oil for export by BNOC,
and other instructions requiring the Corporation to include similar clauses
in contracts for the sale of oil not covered by sale back arrangements are
measures capable of restricting intra-Community trade such as to fall
within the scope of this provision. Secondly, under Article 90(1) in the case
of public undertakings Member States must neither enact nor maintain in
force any measure contrary to the rules of the common market. The expres-
sion "measures" in this provision is thought to cover not merely legislation
and other formal legal measures but also any other governmental instruc-
tion to a public undertaking. 6 1 Therefore, insofar as the government
requires BNOC to act in a manner which would render the latter in viola-
tion of Article 85 or 86 were it acting independently, the conduct of the
government will be such as to infringe Article 90(1).
In its defence, the United Kingdom would presumably invoke Articles
90(2) and 222. As for Article 90(2), it is thought that this provision may
offer a limited defence to a Member State as well as public undertakings. 62
However, for the reasons given above, this provision will not protect action
taken to restrict North Sea oil exports to other Member States and is thus
unlikely to avail the United Kingdom in respect of governmental action
relating to BNOC any more than the Corporation itself. As for Article 222,
the United Kingdom might argue that BNOC operations amount to the
exercise of property rights over oil extracted under licence. However, since
this provision does not permit action to be taken in disregard of the rules of
the common market,63 it is doubtful whether the United Kingdom will be
able to find an adequate defence in Article 222 any more than in Article
90(2).
Conclusion
There would seem, then, to be considerable doubt as to whether the
United Kingdom's North Sea oil policy accords with this country's obliga-
tions under the EEC Treaty. Article 55 imposes a duty on the Commission
to ensure that Community law is respected, and a procedure for taking a
Member State in breach of Community law before the Court exists in Arti-
cle 169. However, the Commission apparently recognises that the applica-
tion of Community law raises issues of such political sensitivity that the
Article 169 procedure may not constitute the most appropriate means of
ensuring its application.
"
1A Vandencasteele, Libre Concurrence et Intervention des Etais dans la Vie Economique, 15
C.D.E. (1979) 540-74, 546. See also J. MEGRET et al., LE DROIT DE LA CEE (Brussels, 1972),
vol. 4, 87.
"





Instead, the Commissiori has favoured informal action and resort to the
less formal procedure in Article 93 in respect of the interest relief grant
scheme. Informal representations to the government do seem to have
enjoyed a degree of success. In addition, the Commission's proposal of
December, 1977 amounted to an attempt to clarify the legal obligations of
the Member States in an international shortage and to secure a legal bind-
ing commitment from their representatives in the Council to refrain from
interfering with intra-Community trade in oil in the face of such a shortage.
This proposal, however, failed to secure Council approval. On the other
hand, it is possible that a solution may be achieved at the political level.
Certainly, in April, 1980 the United Kingdom Prime Minister agreed to a
European Summit Communique expressing the willingness of Member
States to increase production of indigenous oil in the event of an interna-
tional oil shortage. 64 It is possible that this commitment will subsequently
be extended to cover the maintenance, or even the raising, of the level of
exports to other Member States in the event of such a shortage. Unless this
is achieved, the Commission may eventually feel compelled to initiate Arti-
cle 169 proceedings against the United Kingdom.
'Bull. E.C. 4-1980, point 1.1.8.
